I will approach this issue by seeing how Hume's moral theory compares to a contemporary standard of moral skepticism. Using J. L. Mackie's analysis of moral skepticism as a point of reference, I will argue that, as a normative theory, Hume's account of morality is not at all skeptical since he is offering a relatively optimistic consequentialist theory of right and wrong action. As a metaethical theory, however, I will argue that Hume is a weak metaethical skeptic insofar (...) as he denies that morality is indepen- dent of the existence and character of human beings. He should not be considered a thorough or strong metaethical skeptic, though, since he advances a moral theory which is firmly grounded in human instinct. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:33 HOW TO BECOME A MODERATE SKEPTIC: HUME'S WAY OUT OF PYRRHONISM The nature and extent of Hume's skepticism have been assessed in various ways. He was viewed as a radical skeptic until the end of the XIXth century. Many contemporary interpretations, which can be traced back to Kemp Smith's book, have claimed since that a reassessment was indispensable if we are to take seriously either (...) the very project of a science of human nature or Hume's naturalist conception of belief. The idea of a science of human nature presupposes that at least some sort of positive knowledge is possible. The naturalist conception of belief claims that some of our beliefs, though lacking rational justification, are nevertheless unavoidable and gain this way a certainty all their own. Both the Treatise of Human Nature in Book I and the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding -1 conclude with a moderate or mitigated skepticism after making a strong case for radical pyrrhonism. In this paper I wish to carry out two connected tasks: first I want to consider whether Hume's skepticism in the Treatise is the same as that of the Enquiry or not; second, I want to determine which arguments he puts forward for his shift from pyrrhonism to modern skepticism. The most noticeable differences between the Treatise and the Enquiry occur immediately after the analysis of causation. In the Enquiry we find almost nothing concerning the reality of the external world and the nature of the self, but Hume emphasizes heavily the 34 anti-metaphysical and anti-theological outcomes of the science of human nature in his sections on Liberty and Necessity (VIII), on Miracles (X), on Providence and a possible future state (XI). He stresses the devastating agnostic consequences of his principles and his agnosticism culminates in the dreadful censorship of the final lines of the book. On the contrary, the fourth part of the Treatise, Book I, offers an intricate and sophisticated treatment of various subjects. The intricacy shows in the very title of this part: "Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy." Hume actually intertwines the exposition of his skeptical system — an expression which sounds odd — with the critical examination of rival systems and an attempt at accounting for the nature of things. These intricate undertakings are the direct upshot of Hume's analysis of causation. He thinks he has established that our causal beliefs are the products of custom alone and that nevertheless they are our only reliable beliefs. Lacking any rational justification, they are simply natural — which means that we cannot hinder ourselves from making inferences and predictions. Accordingly, reason has been immersed in the wider concept of imagination and thus naturalized: it is "nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls" (T 179). Basically, some beliefs are unavoidable. Now, a crucial problem is to know how far we can go into the analysis of such natural beliefs. In the Treatise, Hume sets out to investigate some of them whereas in the Enquiry he is more prudent and merely talks of instincts without considering their mechanism. In the Treatise, the tentative analysis of these natural beliefs has important metaphysical outcomes. Using the concepts and principles of his new-born science of human nature, Hume provides us with 35 a new ontology which states the nature of things from the standpoint of our beliefs concerning it. Thus, we get a Humean version of the nature of the external world and of the nature of the self. Unfortunately, this assessment of what there is on the basis of what we believe there is has unwanted skeptical effects. Hume's "as if" ontology tends to appear definitely fictitious, all the more so because the analysis of our natural beliefs is not successful and even quite defective. So, the skeptical outcome pushes through the positive project itself as the failure to account for our natural beliefs shakes the very belief in their special reliability. Such is, for example, the blatant result of the study of our belief in the external world (T 217). Again, in the Treatise, Hume is eager to emphasize the devastating anti-metaphysical implications of his thought. Under the... (shrink)

It has become increasingly common to interpret Hume as a `sceptic' of practical reason. This means that Hume supposedly contests, not only the ability of reason to provide demonstrable truths, in the conventional rationalist sense, but also reason's ability to guide our practical action. Proponents of this reading include Jean Hampton, Elijah Millgram and Christine Korsgaard. If this `sceptical reading' of Hume is correct, he would lack the philosophical resources to justify his account of political justice. However, if examined further, (...) this sceptical reading begins with deep-seated Kantian presuppositions about the role and function of practical reason. The paper critiques these presuppositions, arguing that they must be set aside in order to appreciate more fully how Hume does indeed have a proper theory of practical reason. Specifically, Hume believes practical reason encompasses the discursive articulation and evaluation of human character traits and moral values within the social context. These articulatory and intersubjective dimensions of practical reasoning emphasized in the Humean account could provide further theoretical inspiration for communitarian critiques of contemporary liberalism. (shrink)

I aim to sketch a view of a methodology for metaphysics, suggested by Hookway’s reading of C. S. Peirce, that allows one to hold realist metaphysical views (i.e. ones that avoid anti-realism, or idealism) about some questions, but avoids merely verbal disputes, and ‘unwieldy realism’. It is named for Peirce’s ‘Critical Commonsensism’, and uses pragmatic transcendental arguments to defend realism about non-optional basic commitments, e.g. to generality, agency, normativity, modality, change, concrete substances, and other minds. It is critical because we (...) are entitled to hope that the presuppositions of our most basic non-optional commitments obtain, and commonsensical because we begin with our current practices and proceed with anti-sceptical fallibilism. I consider a number of objections to the proposed methodology, including concerns associated with our identification of presuppositions, with the basic non-optional commitments they are presuppositions of, and the community who are so committed. These questions, I will claim, are open to empirical and anthropological investigation, but can begin with careful observation of human practices of action, inquiry, explanation, and justification. I will defend the view we end up with as realist, rather than anti-realist or quasi-realist, and argue that, given holism of confirmation, we are plausibly justified in believing (rather than merely hoping) a number of metaphysical theses that have stood the test of time. (shrink)

With the entry of this carefully reasoned book into the academic world, the current debate on the philosophical bases of feminism reaches a new depth. Richards's analysis of some of the most fundamental issues in women's situation falls into two broad areas: a critique of various methods of reasoning used by feminists and a suggested number of positions on some central feminist concerns. While Richards's book is extremely successful in the first area, it is uneven in the second.

As medical technology has advanced, the question of medical futility has become a topic of intense debate both within the medical community and within society as a whole. However, a unanimous definition thereof is yet to be decided—some commentators are sceptical as to whether an agreement will ever be reached—and this continues to lead to difficulties, tension, and even legal action when a treating physician disagrees with a patient and/or a patient’s family regarding care and treatment options. Although living in (...) a pluralistic society presents one of the major reasons as to why, despite 30 years of intense discussion, no consensus has been made; the issue of medical futility will always be complex as it is, by nature, multifaceted, and numerous elements—including possible risks, evidence of the probability of benefit, the wishes of the patient (and family), professional standards, and cost—interact. Nevertheless, the global medical community has seen the development of two distinctly different approaches to medical futility: one in which the autonomy of patients is of paramount importance in the decision whether or not to pursue a treatment; and one in which beneficence and primum non nocere—first do no harm—are almost entirely the clinician’s prerogative, and whereby he/she has a duty to refuse any treatment for which the potential risks outweigh the potential benefits for the patient. Recently, however, there has been a rejection of this dichotomous view of medical futility and the apparent “power struggle” between physician and patient, and a positive movement towards a more collaborative decision-making process that highlights the necessity of communication, aiming to result in the obtainment of the best possible outcome for each patient as an individual. (shrink)

David Hume, philosopher, historian, economist, librarian, and essayist, was one of the great figures of the European Enlightenment. Unlike some of his famous contemporaries, however, he was not dogmatically committed to idealised conceptions of reason, liberty, and progress. Instead, Hume was a sceptic whose arguments questioned the reach and authority of human rationality, and who put the rivalrous passions of commercial life at the centre of his theory of human -- -- itself. -- ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions (...) series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable. (shrink)

_Skepticism and Cognitivism_ addresses the fundamental question of epistemology: Is knowledge possible? It approaches this query with an evaluation of the skeptical tradition in Western philosophy, analyzing thinkers who have claimed that we can know nothing. After an introductory chapter lays out the central issues, chapter 2 focuses on the classical skeptics of the Academic and Pyrrhonistic schools and then on the skepticism of David Hume. Chapters 3 through 5 are devoted to contemporary defenders of skepticism—Keith Lehrer, Arne Næss, (...) and Peter Unger. In chapter 6, author Oliver A. Johnson dons the mantle of skeptic himself and develops and adds theories to the skeptical arsenal. He closes with an examination of the relationship between skepticism and cognitivism, reaching and defending conclusions on the nature and extent of possible human knowledge. (shrink)

No other recent book in Anglophone philosophy has attracted as much criticism and has found so few friends as Saul Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language". Amongst its critics, one finds the very top of the philosophical profession. Yet, it is rightly counted amongst the books that students of philosophy, at least in the Anglo-American world, have to read at some point in their education. Enormously influential, it has given rise to debates that strike at the very heart of (...) contemporary philosophy of mind and language. In this major new interpretation, Martin Kusch defends Kripke's account against the numerous weighty objections that have been put forward over the past twenty years and argues that none of them is decisive. He shows that many critiques are based on misunderstandings of Kripke's reasoning; that many attacks can be blocked by refining and developing Kripke's position; and that many alternative proposals turn out either to be unworkable or to be disguised variants of the view they are meant to replace. Kusch argues that the apparent simplicity of Kripke's text is deceptive and that a fresh reading gives Kripke's overall argument a new strength. (shrink)

The author, a member of the faculty in philosophy at Visva-Bharati University, produced this volume under appointment as Visiting Fellow at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, after having studied in England. These four essays are concerned with recent analytic thought, concentrating upon the problem of identity and the experiments of reflection which have appeared in modern British philosophy, such as Strawson’s world of nothing but sound. Chandra’s central concern is to analyse the relationship between identity and continuity, and to (...) show that these concepts are not identical. Thus the book is an extended essay in conceptual clarification and logical geography. Saying that a is identical with b is not to say that a is continuous with b. All of this is undertaken because the author finds this inappropriate identification pervasive in contemporary philosophy, and the source of considerable logical confusion, especially in the consideration of personal identity. As an underlying theme attention is also focused upon the relevance of this issue to the debate concerning philosophical skepticism. Strawson’s sound world is seen as an attempt to refute the skeptic, which attempt fails because of Strawson’s failure to distinguish between identity and continuity. With the failure of Strawson’s attack upon the skeptic, and perhaps the phenomenalist as well, his defense of material bodies is thereby undermined. In addition to Strawson, Chandra studies Price, Ryle, Hick, and the very recent work on personal identity by Parfit. The author concludes that identity is consistent with discontinuous existence. He also offers an analysis of after-images, including not only visual after-images but after-images of taste as well. A further underlying theme is the use of science in such thought experiments, for they are frequently presented as if they were of a scientific character, thus exaggerating scientific capabilities. However, the nature of the relationship between philosophy and science is hardly clarified, and the nature of scientific limits remains vague throughout the book. Chandra has isolated a unique feature of contemporary analytic philosophy for consideration, for few others have so concentrated upon this strange feature of thought experiment which pervades British philosophy, nor the identification of identity and continuity. The book would have been improved tremendously, however, if the author had only indicated much more clearly than he does the philosophical conclusions which he wishes to draw from his reflections. These constantly remain uncertain and ambiguous.—H.A.D. (shrink)

Metaphysical inquiry is indebted to the sceptical dialectic for the earlier moments in its investigation. Through that dialectic the field is cleared of the dubitable. We shall here install Descartes' first Meditation as the initial moment in our program. What if all is a dream? Hume supplies our second moment. Immediate experience, such as sensations of color, is undeniable, and that alone. Our third moment is the familiar retrenchment of Hume to a solipsism of the present instant. The past, like (...) the external world, being removed from our direct perception cannot be verified. (shrink)

Are contemporary philosophers to follow Pyrrho of Elis in adopting his skeptic craft or at least core aspects of it as a reaction to the fact that, since immemorial times, persons have been engaged in disputes in metaphysics? Over the last 2500 years or so, most Western philosophers have not done so in being more influenced by Aristotle’s dogmatic craft than by Pyrrho’s skeptic one. Over the last fifty years or so, a few Brazilian neo-Pyrrhonist philosophers, such (...) as Oswald Porchat, Otávio Bueno and Plínio Junqueira Smith, have done the opposite in aiming to spell out the pertinence of Ancient Pyrrhonism to contemporary philosophy. On its part, this essay makes a case for the claim that one is to react to the stated fact by adopting a conflictual craft that promotes a synthesis of Pyrrho’s skeptic craft and the dogmatic craft. This synthesis: brings to light the core features of the skeptic and of the dogmatic craft; problematizes the dogmatic craft by means of the skeptic one and vice-versa so that the shortcomings of these crafts are avoided; and aims to keep certain positive aspects both of the skeptic craft and of the dogmatic one. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article offers a novel sceptical argument that the sensitivity-contextualist must say is sound; moreover, she must say that the conclusion of this argument is true at ordinary standards. The view under scrutiny has it that in different contexts knowledge-attributing sentences express different propositions, propositions which differ in the stretch of worlds across which the subject is required to track the truth. I identify the underlying reason for the sceptical result and argue that it makes sensitivity-contextualism irremediably flawed. Contextualists, I (...) conclude, should abandon sensitivity for some other piece of epistemic machinery. (shrink)

prefaced throughout by editorial comment--on various facets of the idea of reincarnation. The first part quotes from world religions ; the second part focuses on particular writers--grouped by nationality. Even sceptical and opposing views are charitably, though briefly, cited.--A. B.

Pragmatist responses to radical skepticism do not receive much attention in contemporary analytic epistemology. This observation is my motivation for undertaking a search for a coherent pragmatist reply to radical doubt, one that can compete, in terms of clarity and sophistication, with the currently most popular approaches, such as contextualism and relevant alternatives theory. As my point of departure I take the texts of C. S. Peirce and William James. The Jamesian response is seen to consist in the application (...) of a wager argument to the skeptical issue in analogy with Pascal's wager. The Peircean strategy, on the other hand, is to attempt a direct rejection of one of the skeptic's main premises: that we do not know we are not deceived. I argue that while the Jamesian attempt is ultimately incoherent, Peirce's argument contains the core of a detailed and characteristically "pragmatic" rebuttal of skepticism, one that deserves to be taken seriously in the contemporary debate. (shrink)

I explicate and defend Kant's analysis of “skepticism” as a single, metaphilosophically unified rational phenomenon (at A756–764/B784–797, for instance). Kant anticipates one of the defining trends of contemporary epistemology's approach to radical philosophical skepticism: the thought that skepticism cannot be directly refuted, by demonstrating its falsity, but must be diagnosed, to show that its premises are unnatural, and consequently fail to be rationally compelling from within our own nonskeptical standpoint. Kant's most ambitious claim here is that he will develop (...) this diagnosis in a unitary fashion, by demonstrating that Cartesian, Humean, Pyrrhonian, and Agrippan skepticism are essentially interrelated as so many means to “the skeptic's” defining philosophical end. This “unity thesis” comes in both weak and strong variations. First, and more weakly, Kant argues that apparently distinct skeptical problematics share certain crucial metaphilosophical assumptions about the nature of reason, and the role of philosophical self-knowledge. More strongly, he also claims that the four problematics just mentioned are related hierarchically, in that the more fundamental skeptical worries constitute the essential dialectical context for the less fundamental ones, such that the more superficial problematics only arise if a logically prior worry is first acceded to. By showing how deeply these two unity theses structure Kant's Critical methodology, I argue that the Kantian view of philosophy as a “doctrine of wisdom” incorporates, and arguably surpasses, a number of key insights found in more recent work. The final result is that the transcendental philosopher may hope to co-opt the attractions of skepticism without making any unnecessary concessions along the way. (shrink)

Skepticism is one of the most enduring and profound of philosophical problems. With its roots in Plato and the Sceptics to Descartes, Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein, skepticism presents a challenge that every philosopher must reckon with. In this outstanding collection philosophers engage with skepticism in five clear sections: the philosophical history of skepticism in Greek, Cartesian and Kantian thought; the nature and limits of certainty; the possibility of knowledge and related problems such as perception and the debates between objective knowledge (...) and constructivism; the transcendental method as a response to skepticism and the challenge of naturalism; overcoming the skeptical challenge. (shrink)

The idea of meaning plays, together with the notion of caring, a pivotal role in recent nursing theory, informing its approach to philosophy, research and practice. Unlike caring, however, it has received relatively little analytical attention – a fact that is surprising in view of the scepticism about meaning that is characteristic of much contemporary philosophy and social theory. This paper reviews the philosophical literature on meaning, highlighting sceptical currents in the Wittgensteinian corpus, neo‐behaviourism and poststructuralism. It also considers (...) a similar line of thought that has emerged in social theory, questioning the explanatory value of concepts such as ‘practice’, ‘culture’, ‘norms’, ‘tacit knowledge’, and ‘tradition’. All these perspectives suggest that there is something wrong with the common‐sense picture of a set of shared, implicit rules that account for our ability to understand and communicate; and they all point to an alternative picture which is naturalistic, materialist and causal, and which depicts ‘shared meaning’ as a rather mysterious quality, unable to explain the familiar regularities of verbal and nonverbal behaviour. In this picture, while the idea of meaning can be retained, it ceases to be something shared, and becomes something individual and idiosyncratic, a unique cluster of associations, concomitants, and other habits of thought. The paper closes with a brief interpretation of what the alternative implies for a research methodology in nursing. In particular, it proposes that certain well established approaches will have to be abandoned, and that qualitative strategies will have to be grounded in a rigorous scientific framework, rather than in techniques (such as phenomenology), which presuppose a misleading and inaccurate conception of what meaning is. (shrink)

Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato explores a Socratic intuition about belief, doxa -- belief is "shameful." In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Vogt shows how deeply this proposal differs from contemporary views, but that it nevertheless speaks to intuitions we are likely to share with Plato, ancient skeptics, and Stoic epistemologists.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume on Human Excellence Marie A. Martin Hume was, in important respects, still verymuch a part ofthe classical ethical tradition. This is something we tend to overlook because we come out of a distinctly modern moral tradition, and we normally approach Hume looking for answers to a set of questions that are distinct, and often far removed, from the central questions of the classical tradition. Yet, the classical aspects (...) of Hume's ethics are not irrelevant to contemporary moral debates. There is evidence in recent years of a growing discontent with all the permutations of the two dominant strands of contemporary moral thought, Kantianism and utilitarianism. The sort of radical critique found in the works of Maclntyre, the increasing popularity of communitarian theories, and the resurgence of interest in virtue ethics in general, and Aristotelianism in particular, are all indications of this discontent. What I wish to suggest is that Hume's moral thought might prove a rich source for those who are dissatisfied with the direction ofmodern moral theory, and especially for those who believe that there is something within the classical tradition of virtue ethics worth salvaging. For Hume is a virtue ethicist, albeit one in modern dress, who, poised between the ancients and moderns, self-consciously chose to align himself with the ancient tradition, asserting its superiority over the modern. The ancient moralists are, Hume claims, the "best models,"1 morals being the one science "inwhich theyare not surpassed by the moderns" (E 330). The aim of this paper is to take an initial step towards refocusing our view on the largely neglected classical aspects of Hume's moral thought. The relationship between Hume's moral thought and the classical tradition is both extensive and complex, and I do not pretend to do anything more in this paper than present the tip of the iceberg. But the tip I shall examine is central to all that lies below; it is Hume's conception ofhuman excellence. Virtue or Human Excellence Perhaps Hume's most complete description ofhuman excellence occurs in the conclusion ofAn Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals. Hume presents us with the fictional character, Cleanthes, as one whom "a philosopher might select... as a model ofperfect virtue" (E 270). He is, Hume claims, "a man ofhonour andhumanity," one ofwhom "[e]very one, who has anyintercourse... is sure offair and kind treatment." His Volume XVIII Number 2 383 MARIE A. MARTIN "assiduous application... [and] quick penetration... prognosticate the greatest honours and advancement." His company is enjoyed by all because he has "so much wit with good manners; so much gallantry without affectation" and "so much ingenious knowledge." His "cheerfulness... runs through the whole tenor ofhislife, and preserves a perpetual serenity on his countenance, and tranquillity ofhis soul." Finally, "[h]e has met with severe trials, misfortunes as well as dangers; and by his greatness ofmind, was still superior to all ofthem" (E 269-70). In the Treatise, Hume offers a less specific, yet similar portrait of human excellence: when we enumerate the good qualities of any person, we always mention those parts ofhis character, which renderhim a safe companion, an easy friend, a gentle master, an agreeable husband, or an indulgent father. We consider him with all hisrelations in society; andlove orhate him, according as he affects those, who have any immediate intercourse with him. And 'tis a most certain rule, that if there be no relation oflife, in which I cou'd not wish to stand to aparticular person, his character must so far be allow'd to be perfect. If he be as little wanting to himselfas to others, his character is entirely perfect.2 Although there are numerous passages throughout Hume's works that paint the same general picture, I will offer only one more, his description of an ideally virtuous disposition from his essay, The Sceptic: that which leads to action and employment, renders us sensible to the social passions, steels the heart against the assaults offortune, reduces the affections to ajustmoderation, makes our own thoughts an entertainment to us, and inclines us rather to the pleasure of society and conversation, than to those ofthe senses.3 What is common to all these descriptions... (shrink)

The article presents an attempt to evaluate the influence of the late Wittgenstein philosophy (by the example of the rule-following problem) on sociology and some empirical programs of sociological research. At first we give a brief overview of the rule-following problem and consider, on the one hand, a skeptical reading and a skeptical solution to the problem by S. Kripke and, on the other hand, criticism towards Kripke by some Wittgensteinians). Then we reveal the role of skeptic reading in (...) the sociological works of D. Bloor and the role of anti-sceptic reading in ethnomethodological projects. At the end we show the paramount importance of Peter Winch – we prove the following thesis: the ideas of Peter Winch anticipated many of the points and arguments in the dispute between D. Bloor and ethnomethodology. (shrink)

A prominent trend in recent work on Hume’s epistemology has it that the concerns of Part Three of Book One of the Treatise, ‘Of knowledge and probability’, are purely descriptive and explanatory. Don Garrett and David Owen have argued that Hume’s primary interest lies in showing that it is not reason but rather the imagination that enables us to use experience to form beliefs about the future. Reason cannot be responsible for such beliefs; for if it were, it would have (...) to proceed by means of the principle ‘that those instances of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience’; and there is no source for that principle in either experience or reason itself. Of course, no belief is shown to be unjustified simply by the fact that it is produced by the imagination and not by reasoning. For Hume’s reasons for scepticism about the trustworthiness of the imagination, the reader has to wait until Part Four, and its claim that ‘there is a direct and total opposition…betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect, and those that persuade us of the continu’d and independent existence of body’. Louis Loeb agrees that Book One of the Treatise demands to be read as having two stages, the first constructive, the second destructive. But he has an intriguing and unusual take on the first stage. He believes that there is more to Part Three than mere description and explanation. There is in addition a theory of justification. In this part of the Treatise Hume shows himself to have a ‘pre-theoretical’ commitment to the view that, all things being equal, beliefs produced by certain belief-forming mechanisms within the faculty of imagination count as knowledge; and also seeks to give this commitment a theoretical rationale. If Loeb is right, the old view of Hume as a sceptic about induction needs to be revised even more radically than Garrett and Owen would have us believe. (shrink)

The problem of evil typically allows the existence of evil to go unchecked. However, in order to be able to press the problem of evil against the theist, the skeptic must offer an account of evil. We examine several of these God-independent accounts and show how difficult it is to define evil without ultimately relying on the metaphysics of value that theism provides. On the other hand, according to the God-dependent account of evil that we endorse, God is logically (...) and metaphysically antecedent to evil. Thus, in either case, the “problem” of evil for the theist can never coherently arise. (shrink)

Sceptical Paths gathers a variety of innovative studies that inquire into the presence and function of sceptical elements, strategies, and approaches in various traditions throughout Ancient, Medieval, Modern, and contemporary philosophy. Special at.

The theory that practical reasoning is wholly instrumental says that the only practical function of reason is to tell agents the means to their ends, while their ends are fixed by something other than reason itself. In this essay I argue that Hume has an instrumentalist theory of practical reasoning. This thesis may sound as unexciting as the contention that Kant is a rationalist about morality. For who would have thought otherwise? After all, isn't the ‘instrumentalist’ line in contemporary (...) discussions of this topic descended directly from Hume himself? Contrast the following recent comment from Robert Audi's book on practical reasoning, holding the standard line, with the comment from Christine Korsgaard following it:Hume's conception of practical reasoning, so far as we can formulate it, can be located within … the foundationalist account of motivation in which reason plays the instrumentalist role … by virtue of arousing and directing our desires. (shrink)

So-called grand or paradigmatic theories—structural functionalism, psychoanalysis, Marxism, rational-choice theory—provide their proponents with a conceptual vocabulary and syntax that allows for the classification and configuring of wide ranges of phenomena. Advocates for any particular “analytical grammar” are accordingly prone to conflating the internal coherence of their paradigm—its integrated complex of definitions, axioms, and inferences—with a corresponding capacity for representational verisimilitude. The distinction between Theory-as-heuristic and Theory-as-imposition is of course difficult to negotiate in practice, given that empirical observation and measurement are (...) not entirely “theory neutral” or independent of prior analytical conceptualization. Nonetheless, the scientific cogency of any theory is ultimately evaluated by the substantive realism of its foundational assumptions and categorical designations; that is, the accuracy with which it identifies and tracks the determinant properties and processes of the phenomena to be explicated. The paradigm of sociocultural evolutionism—despite extensive revamping by contemporary proponents—does not carry warrant in this regard, as its recourse to an analytical grammar fashioned and derived from another discipline raises doubts about its empirical veridicality. This article revisits the contentious issue of remodeling social phenomena in accordance with biological categories and offers both a theoretical and a substantive critique of the “selectionist” paradigm. The transdisciplinary program of historical social science is affirmed by way of counterpoint. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus’s “Outlines of Pyrrhonism.” by Benson MatesDavid K. GliddenBenson Mates. The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus’s “Outlines of Pyrrhonism.” New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. x + 335. Cloth, $55.00, Paper, $22.95.Benson Mates’s translation and commentary of Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism appears nearly half a century after Mates first began his pioneering work on Sextus and Hellenistic philosophy. This publication coincides (...) with another new translation of the Outlines by Annas and Barnes, who provide only an abbreviated commentary (Cambridge University Press, 1994). After decades when the only available English translation was by Bury from the Loeb, there are now choices available which allow Sextus to be taught to different sorts of English readers.In comparing the two translations, this reader found the Annas and Barnes version more mellifluous. Mates is not as sweet. His style is plain-spoken, but this approach has merits when the arguments get going. The Annas and Barnes version uses footnotes for commentary, along with a brief introduction. Their notes cite parallel passages in other works by Sextus, provide brief guidance for interpretation when it is most needed, and connect the reader with a focused list of bibliographical references, inviting readers themselves to turn toward scholarly debates over certain controversial passages. Consequently, Annas and Barnes opens out to a wide audience of classicists, historians, students of literature, general readers interested in scepticism, as well as philosophers of whatever ideology. [End Page 460]The Mates edition is directed toward philosophers alone. It is much less oriented toward historical scholarship, preferring to read Sextus as a contemporary professional philosopher might. In this way, Mates will approach a passage from the Outlines in terms of a passage in Hume or Berkeley, even though, of course, these latter-day philosophers derived their views from reading Sextus. Mates employs philosophese with ease, constructing a version of Sextus from the professional philosopher’s interpretive stance, in the language of propositions and Fregean intensions. The audience Mates is writing for and the viewpoint he is writing from more or less correspond to the “analytical” faction of the American Philosophical Association. Postmodern Foucaultians, contextualist historians, and Hellenistic scholars might find this approach unhelpful, even irritating. But busy, mainstream American philosophers could find Mates’s approach sufficiently sympathetic to actually read some Sextus, in the way Chisholm once had done, finding a passage on the Cyrenaics in Sextus which led to the reinvention of “adverbial appears locutions” and which, in turn, played for decades in the epistemological arcades.Mates begins his edition with a systematic introduction to the Outlines and follows his translation with another hundred pages of narrative, reflecting primarily what Mates finds interesting about certain selected passages. Although, like Annas and Barnes, he provides parallel passages, ancient references, and highly abbreviated accounts of scholarly disputes, his own narrative line dominates both his introductory essay and his commentary. Mates writes in a somewhat chatty style prone to the blunt Cephalean confidence that comes with considerable experience and success as a professional philosopher. His narrative line is clear, connected, often compelling, as for instance when he argues that for Sextus “dogmatizing and believing turn out to be one and the same” (61).Fashion has returned to favor Pyrrhonism in the late twentieth century, just as the cycle had come around before, toward the end of the sixteenth century, sparking a philosophical renaissance. This time around the import may be different. Both Annas and Barnes as well as Mates find Sextus worth reading as serious philosophy. This is a considerable improvement in the fortuna of the Outlines. For decades Sextus was banned in American philosophy departments, as no philosopher at all. He was not taught, he was not read. One highly prominent American philosopher was expressly forbidden to write a dissertation on him, around the time Mates and Chisholm had the courage to publish on him. Sextus is now welcome in the Canon.If Sextus now is one of us, a serious philosopher, then the dogmatists (Stoics, Epicureans, Peripatetics, etc.) he ridiculed were merely failures. The game continues. So, Mates, Annas and Barnes can embrace Sextus as ours. His readers won’t... (shrink)

This paper argues that, contrary to most interpretations, e.g., those of Reid, Popkin and Passmore, Hume is not a sceptic with regard to reason. The argument of Treatise I, IV. i, of course, has a sceptical conclusion with regard to reason, and a somewhat similar point is made by Cleanthes in the Dialogues. This paper argues that the argument of Treatise I, IV. i is parallel to similar arguments in Bentham and Laplace. The latter are, as far as they go, (...) sound, and so is Hume’s. But the limitations of all mean that they cannot sustain a general argument against reason. Hume the historian is quite aware of these limitations. So is Hume the philosopher. A careful examination of the other references in the Treatise to the argument of I, IV. i reveals that Hume not only rejects but constructs a sound case against accepting the sceptical conclusion, arguing that reason can indeed show the sceptic’s argument to be unreasonable. A close reading of the Dialogues shows that Hume there also draws the same conclusion. The thrust of the paper is to go some way towards showing that it is a myth that Hume is a pyrrhonian sceptic. (shrink)

The works of Paul K. Feyerabend, Norwood Russell Hanson and Thomas S. Kuhn have come to occupy a central place in the annals of contemporary philosophy of science. Some of their contemporaries,, tend to regard them as the vanguard of a new “revolutionary” intellectual movement. Reacting against the views of their positivist predecessors, they embrace and propagate the idea that “pervasive presuppositions” are fundamental to scientific investigations. Thus, Feyerabend thinks that, “... scientific theories are ways of looking at the (...) world; and their adoption affects our general beliefs and expectations, and thereby also our experiences and our conception of reality”. This is in stark contrast to the positivist view that the aim of science is the systematization of experience that exists independently of any scientific theories. This new view of scientific theories also involves a “radical” conception of the nature of theoretical change. Rejecting the positivist notion of any constant element through such change, Kuhn regards a basic theoretical change as a conceptual revolution and “wants to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world”. Hanson uses the phrase ‘theory-loaded’ to give expression to a view of the semantic content of observation statements that follows from this general position. (shrink)

In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Vogt shows how deeply this proposal differs from contemporary views, but that it nevertheless speaks to intuitions we are likely to share with Plato, ancient skeptics, and Stoic epistemologists.

Mersenne's answer to Pyrrhonism begins with a great deal of bombast in his dedicatory letter to the king's brother. The sceptics are the enemies of science, they are unworthy of being called men. Since they cannot support the light of truth within themselves they try to limit all human knowledge to the outward appearance of things, and to reduce mankind to a state as lowly as the stupidest animals. The sceptics are the enemies of God and science. What Mersenne was (...) seeking was a rational way of supporting simultaneously the truths of religion and of physics against the attacks of the Pyrrhonists and the Renaissance humanists. The only sceptic that Mersenne names is Sextus Empiricus. He probably had seen Gassendi's work since they had become friends around this time, and had joined forces in attacking the pernicious influence of the alchemist and Rosicrusian, Robert Fludd. (shrink)

This volume, included in the recently established Library of Philosophy and Religion, devotes its primary attention to recent discussion within analytic philosophy concerning the challenge which determinism offers to the concept of freedom and, thereby, to Christian theism. Although the author does not argue that determinism has been established, he does conclude that it is an empirical proposal and may well represent the situation. He is prepared to fall back upon a libertarianism if necessary, but considers determinism at face value (...) in order to confront the most serious opposition to his proposed compatibilism. There may be a sufficient condition for all acts, which would be, thereby, a determinism. Young’s problem is to establish a compatibilism so that even if a sufficient condition for all acts does hold, man is still free and responsible, and a Christian theism could be preserved. He proceeds to analyze four types of sufficient condition: 1) some laws of logic are sufficient for all outcomes; 2) antecedent causal conditions account for all outcomes; 3) God’s infallible knowledge and His eternal nature are the sufficient conditions for whatever happens; 4) an omnipotent deity is the sufficient condition of all outcomes. Young then attempts to establish that a doctrine of freedom and responsibility is compatible with each of these conditions and, thereby, Christian theism is, to that extent, secured. He offers a very careful analysis of each alternative, considering the strongest claims of recent analysts, and still finds a doctrine of responsible freedom viable, analysed in terms of ability and power to act. In the course of his analysis he gives more attention than the skeptic usually offers to the content of the skeptic’s world, and what would be involved in its analysis of freedom, action, responsibility, and evil. The skeptic’s world offers more theoretical problems than the skeptic’s neglect of his own positive position and his confining of analysis to a critical role has usually acknowledged. Although one might not have expected it to arise in such quarters, it is now well established that analytic philosophy offers a well developed and complex elaboration of natural theology and philosophy of religion, and in the revival of natural theology in analytic circles this book deserves careful attention.—H.A.D. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials ed. by Roger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom SorellRichard A. WatsonRoger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom Sorell, editors. Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xviii + 170. Cloth, $54.95. Paper, $18.95.This volume includes primarily source materials from authors who were contemporary to Descartes’s composition of the Meditations. Thus there are no selections from Augustine, Aquinas, and Montaigne, (...) for example, who were more influential on the Meditations than some of the authors excerpted. Of course their influence is already amply documented by such scholars as Gilson and Gouhier. Probably the most important source included is Suárez, whose role is championed by Jean-Luc Marion in several works. Readers should look for the forthcoming Index Augustino-Cartèsian: Textes et Commentaire by Zbigniew Janowski (Paris: J. Vrin) for a startling challenge to the view that Descartes is Suárezian.In the volume under review, Eustachius a Sancto Paulo is of special interest because Descartes thought of refuting him item by item (but decided exposition of his own view would be adequate). In his youth Descartes had a definite interest in Petrus Ramus, although Beeckman told him his method consisted of tired old tricks. Francisco Sanches and Pierre Charron are important for their expositions of sceptical arguments and attitudes. Christopher Clavius is Descartes’s direct predecessor in mathematical analysis, and none of Descartes’s protests that he never read the man has convinced anyone. Scipion Dupleix is a fine example of how the Old Philosophy appeared to the New Philosophers, and Marin Mersenne, of course, compiled material on every subject Descartes ever had an interest in. Pierre Gassendi exercised Descartes’s ire more than any other commentator on the Meditations, and Descartes again probably read Gassendi’s continuing criticisms even though he claimed he wouldn’t. [End Page 366]Of special interest is Jean de Silhon, an old friend of Descartes’s who published a book containing a proto-cogito three years before the Meditations appeared. François de la Mothe le Vayer represents the libertine strain many detect in Descartes’s writings, while Jean-Baptiste Morin provides fodder for those who detect Descartes’s piety, although Descartes asserts that the man is an idiot for defending the immobility of the earth. Finally, Charles Sorel provides an example of the deductive mode of exposition in a text that shows that the notion of a unified science was more than Cartesian. One contemporary who was left out and should have been included was the Augustinian Guillaume Gibieuf.But overall, this is an interesting and useful collection of works Descartes doubtless knew. [End Page 367]Richard A. WatsonWashington UniversityCopyright © 1999 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

I present an argument for a sophisticated version of sceptical invariantism that has so far gone unnoticed: Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism (BSI). I argue that it can, on the one hand, (dis)solve the Gettier problem, address the dogmatism paradox and, on the other hand, show some due respect to the Moorean methodological incentive of ‘saving epistemic appearances’. A fortiori, BSI promises to reap some other important explanatory fruit that I go on to adduce (e.g. account for concessive knowledge attributions). BSI can (...) achieve this much because it distinguishes between two distinct but closely interrelated (sub)concepts of (propositional) knowledge, fallible-but-safe knowledge and infallible-and-sensitive knowledge, and explains how the pragmatics and the semantics of knowledge discourse operate at the interface of these two (sub)concepts of knowledge. I conclude that BSI is a novel theory of knowledge discourse that merits serious investigation. (shrink)

Philosophy in the period immediately after Aristotle is sometimes thought to be marked by the decline of natural philosophy and philosophical disinterest in contemporary achievements in the sciences. But in one area at least, the early third century B.C.E. was a time of productive interaction between such disparate fields as epistemology, physics and geometry. Debates between the sceptics and the dogmatic philosophical schools focus on epistemological problems about the possibility of self-evident appearances, but there is evidence from Euclid's day (...) of a quite different response. The sceptical challenge provoked the development of theories explaining error formation, showing how illusions can be studied systematically and are subject to prediction. Such theories do not legitimate claims about the nature of the underlying entities perceived, but provide justification for forming expectations about future perceptions. While it overtly focuses on purely geometrical considerations, the Euclidean model of optics nonetheless provides support for certain views about the nature of vision and the physics of light. Moreover, by offering a model in which the image received is not thought to be a perspicuous mirroring of the object seen, Euclid may have helped promote a view of perception as something reconstructed from information received, not as a mere form transferred into the eye. The ancient sceptic may indeed have fulfilled his promise to promote inquiry by focusing attention on problems that escape the attention of a hasty theorist. (shrink)

Sceptical theism is supposed, by a number of philosophers, to undercut the evidential basis for the evidential problem of evil. In this paper, I argue that even ifsceptical theism succeeds, its success comes with a hefty epistemic price: it threatens to undermine a good deal of what we supposedly know. Call this the problem of epistemic evil. Thus, sceptical theism has a costly philosophical price of admission. In light of this, it seems that the evidential problem of evil is harder (...) to dislodge than it might have initially seemed; i.e. with sceptical theism, we trade the evidential problem of evil for the problem of epistemic evil. (shrink)